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The NLD and Myanmar’s Foreign Policy: 
Not New, But Different 
Maung Aung Myoe 
Abstract: This article argues that although the NLD government con-
tinues to adhere to the “independent, active, and non-aligned foreign 
policy,” the policy will be implemented through multiple tracks in di-
plomacy with a possibility of stronger focus on people-to-people con-
tacts and multilateralism. The NLD’s foreign policy, in terms of objec-
tives and principles, is not new but it is different, as adjustments are 
made in the realm of diplomacy. The reasons for this lack of foreign 
policy change or transformation are that (1) the predecessor USDP gov-
ernment has more or less adjusted the country’s foreign policy, (2) the 
Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) continues to exercise strong influ-
ence over the foreign policy process, (3) the emerging geopolitical envi-
ronment in the Asia-Pacific region shapes the country’s foreign policy 
choices, and (4) the NLD’s leadership style and political mandate provide 
little room for public access and input in foreign policy decision-making. 
It is expected that activism in Myanmar’s foreign policy will be once 
again centre stage, with more dynamic diplomacy being conducted 
through multiple tracks under the NLD government. Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s fame and global influence is perhaps the most important asset and 
driving force behind Myanmar’s return to the world of international 
diplomacy. Myanmar’s foreign policy under the NLD government, while 
retaining the survival and security of the state at its core, will not aim for 
the narrow interest of regime survival, but instead for the best interests 
of both state and society in Myanmar.  
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Introduction 
After more than half a century of either direct military rule or military-
backed governments in Myanmar, a civilian government came to power 
in March of 2016, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) 
following a landslide victory in the November 2015 elections. U Htin 
Kyaw, a close confidante and lieutenant of Nobel laureate Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi, became the president. At the time of this writing, Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi is union minister for foreign affairs, a significant posi-
tion given that the foreign minister sits in both the cabinet and, more 
importantly, in the all-powerful National Defence and Security Council 
(NDSC); and is also the union minister for the president’s office, which 
oversees all ministries of the government. Moreover, on 6 April 2016, 
she became “state counsellor”, the most controversial position created 
for her in the current political setting in Myanmar, with a protocol sec-
ond only to the president, above two vice-presidents and all others. For 
all intents and purposes, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is the de facto ruler of 
Myanmar, rhetorically “staying above the president”.  
As a long-term outspoken critic of countries supporting the previ-
ous military regime (1988–2010) and a beneficiary of Western support 
for promoting democracy in Myanmar, there are speculations and expec-
tations that Myanmar’s foreign policy under the NLD administration led 
by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would lean towards the West in general and 
Washington in particular, at the expense of displeasure and anxiety in 
Beijing (and, to a lesser extent, in Moscow). It was perhaps against this 
background that the Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC), hinted just a few days after the NLD’s electoral victory 
that Myanmar’s closer ties with United States at the expense of Chinese 
strategic interest would not serve Myanmar’s long-term interests (Global 
Times 2015). To the best of my knowledge, no proper academic analysis 
has yet been conducted on the NLD’s foreign policy, although a few 
journalistic or op-ed style pieces have been published (Selth 2016; Dai 
and Zhang 2016; Chow and Easley 2016; Chaw Chaw Sein 2016). While 
those articles do argue that the NLD’s foreign policy would not be so 
much different from the previous government,1 there was little or no 
explanation for why it would be the case, perhaps due to space limita-
tions.  
The present paper studies the NLD government’s foreign policy. At 
the outset, I should admit that it is an interim assessment on the NLD’s 
                                                 
1  For instance, Andrew Selth argued that Myanmar’s current non-aligned stance 
will undergo only minor adjustment. 
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foreign policy based on publicly available documents after one year in 
office. It is difficult to conduct interviews and study internal official 
documents. However, I sincerely believe that it is sufficient to present 
the NLD government’s foreign policy. I analyse Myanmar’s overall for-
eign policy posture and practices. I argue that although the NLD gov-
ernment continues to adhere to the “independent, active and non-
aligned foreign policy”, the policy will be implemented through multiple 
tracks in diplomacy with a possibility of stronger focus on people-to-
people contacts and multilateralism. Therefore, I argue that the NLD’s 
foreign policy, in terms of objectives and principles, is not new but it is 
different, as adjustments are made in the realm of diplomacy. The rea-
sons for this lack of foreign policy change or transformation are that (1) 
the predecessor USDP government have more or less adjusted the coun-
try’s foreign policy, (2) the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) contin-
ues to exercise strong influence over the foreign policy process, (3) the 
emerging geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region shape the 
country’s foreign policy choice, and (4) the NLD’s leadership style and 
political mandate provides little room for public access and input in 
foreign policy decision making.  
1 NLD and Foreign Policy Statements 
When the NLD issued its manifesto for national elections in 2015, it 
provided the following mission statement on foreign policy: 
(1) To pursue an active and independent foreign policy, and to es-
tablish friendly and close political relations with regard to interna-
tional matters that may arise firmly on the side of genuine demo-
cratic values. (2) To identify and cooperate with other countries 
on joint economic enterprises of mutual benefit. In particular, to 
work together for the benefit of the region on issues relating to 
regional organizations and programmes. (3) To have close and 
strong relations with the UN, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and other such organizations. (4) To give particu-
lar emphasis to the role of civil society organisations in communi-
cating with the international community.2 
In her interview with the Washington Post on 19 November 2015, about 
10 days after it had become clear that the NLD won a landslide victory, 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi confirmed that her government would follow a 
                                                 
2  National League for Democracy 2015 Election Manifesto (authorised translation), p. 8. 
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non-aligned foreign policy as this had been a successful strategy ever 
since Myanmar gained its independence (Weymouth 2015). On 30 March 
2016, President Htin Kyaw delivered his inaugural speech but did not 
mention anything about his government’s foreign policy. Just one week 
after the inauguration of the NLD government, on 7 April 2016, the 
state-owned Myanma Alin newspaper, now controlled by the NLD’s 
minister for information, carried an editorial on Myanmar foreign policy 
that said:  
the essence of Myanmar foreign policy, persistently practiced from 
the time of the liberation from the colonial yoke to the present, is 
maintaining friendly relations with countries all over the world. 
(Myanma Alin 2016a) 
The editorial also claimed that:  
Myanmar’s foreign policy, based on friendship with all, will not 
only continue to be consistent with the changing world politics 
but also, besides enhancing national interests, serves the world 
peace, development, and prosperity as it enters into the 21st centu-
ry. (Myanma Alin 2016a) 
Then, on 18 April 2016, in her Myanmar New Year message, for the first 
time since she became foreign minister, Aung San Suu Kyi briefly ex-
plained Myanmar’s foreign policy. In somewhat vague and ambiguous 
terms, she stated: 
I think people will want to know our foreign policy as our country 
has to struggle in the global context. Ever since the attainment of 
independence, our country has maintained good relations with 
countries all over the world. This is something that our country 
can be very much proud of. Since regaining independence in Jan-
uary 1948, our country, despite being a small and war-torn country, 
has always won international respect. Why? [It is because] the tal-
ent of our people has been resilient and shining even amidst the 
dramatic woe. We are all required to make concerted effort to 
reach such a level of talent internationally recognised again. We 
need to ponder how to continue our journey and which policies and which fun-
damental ideologies to adopt. This will be a long journey. And the fu-
ture of a nation is a thing of eternity. This is an ordeal, having to 
face a host of challenges. (Aung San Suu Kyi 2016) (Italics added) 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s key message appears to be that it is the overall level 
of Myanmar people’s talent and quality human resources that raises the 
  The NLD and Myanmar’s Foreign Policy 93
 

 
prestige and status of the country and is the key to Myanmar’s foreign 
policy success. 
Finally, on 22 April 2016, the foreign minister briefed Myanmar’s 
diplomatic community on the country’s foreign policy. While the briefing 
was short on details about what principles, objectives, goals and strate-
gies Myanmar would pursue, it generally dealt with overall nature of 
diplomacy that Myanmar’s foreign policy would embrace. Neutralism, 
universal friendship, human rights were key words in her speech. She 
stated: 
Since we became independent in 1948, we have adopted a policy 
of neutrality and universal friendship. We were one of the first 
signatories to the United Nations charter and to the United Na-
tions’ Charter on [Universal Declaration of] Human Rights, which 
means we always emphasise the need for international cooperation 
and the need to respect human beings as required because friend-
ship and peace are dependent on security and happiness of all 
people in the world. This has always been our aim – that our 
country should be the grounds for fostering better relations not 
just between our neighbours and ourselves, but between us and 
the rest of the world and between all other countries as well. 
What is not clear in her statement is the extent to which the NLD gov-
ernment believes in the collective security of the UN and the centrality 
of international regimes in interstate relations. In addition to confirma-
tion of Myanmar’s neutralist foreign policy, the foreign minister ex-
plained a vision in her foreign policy in the following terms. 
We are not a very big or very powerful country. But we hope that 
we will be able to lead the world when it comes to approaching all 
the problems that beset our globe with sincerity, with goodwill 
towards all, and with a genuine desire to work hard to achieve the 
kind of situation of which all human beings dream, which we very 
seldom manage to achieve. It is always good to have goals, even if 
these goals seem sometimes unattainable, I think it is a basic ne-
cessity that we should aim high. 
The rest of the briefing was about what Aung San Suu Kyi called “a new 
approach” for her vision, which basically was a people-centred diploma-
cy. The briefing was hailed in editorials in state-owned newspapers on 23 
April 2016. The Kyemon Daily, with a little exaggeration, praised the brief-
ing, saying that “such a clear official explanation on Myanmar foreign 
policy was rarely heard in the past”. “We are witnessing a change from 
government-to-government relations that we used to see in the past to 
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people-based relations”, the paper claimed. It further waxed lyrical on 
the “people-based diplomacy” by saying that “in reality, friendly relations 
among countries all over the world is a necessity for peace prevailed 
among people on the globe and this kind of universal friendship could 
be possible only with the people-centred relations.” In Myanma Alin Daily, 
the editorial entitled “Diplomacy and Future Vision” explained Myan-
mar’s foreign policy in historical, cultural and geopolitical context:  
Our country has a good tradition of being well versed in interna-
tional relations and diplomacy since ancient time. After the inde-
pendence, our country has followed an independent non-aligned 
policy and stayed neutral in the East-West Cold War struggle. Due 
to our country’s correct policy stance on the international political 
stage and our ardent adherence to Myanmar culture and tradition 
that firmly rooted in four worldly cardinal values of loving-
kindness (metta), compassion (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita) 
and equanimity (upekkha), even at the height of the Cold War, 
Myanmar national U Thant served as the secretary general of the 
United Nations and handled [international] crises of most danger-
ous magnitude threatening world peace. […] The geographical lo-
cation of Myanmar has special characteristics. As it is situated be-
tween two Asian great powers, China and India, and between re-
gional groupings of South Asia and Southeast Asia, there are both 
opportunities and challenges for our country. By adopting and fol-
lowing correct policies, we have to turn these challenges into op-
portunities. Unity is an essential requirement [for Myanmar] to be-
come a strong nation. Political power, economic power and na-
tional defence power cannot be built up separately, but only 
through coordination and in support of each other. For materiali-
sation of these powers, it is necessary to build monolithic unity 
within the country. The pronouncement of determination to make 
Myanmar a strong nation through the strength and effort of the 
people to the world is like we are seeing a clear vision of our 
country’s future and expressing our resolute confidence in the 
people. (Myanma Alin 2016b)3 
Much later, the NLD’s weekly journal, D Wave, published on 9 May 2016, 
carried an editorial entitled “Historical Mosaics of Myanmar’s Foreign 
Policy” (D-Wave Journal 2016). However, the NLD’s interpretation and 
understanding of Myanmar foreign policy took a critical tone and was 
partly based on simplistic views and assumptions; it also had loaded 
                                                 
3  The editorial mistakenly mentioned “brahmavihras” as “lawkavihras”.  
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words and phrases. Since the journal essentially reflects the NLD’s view, 
it is worth quoting in full: 
Myanmar’s non-aligned policy practiced since the independence in 
1948 was regarded by great countries in the world as suitable to 
world politics of the time and an appropriate policy. If we analyse 
the historical mosaic of Myanmar’s foreign policy 68 years later, [it 
could be found that] the policy was determined by political belief 
of and political system practiced by people who controlled the 
state. Sometimes, the foreign policy got a bad reputation because 
of mental instability of a dictator. […] After independence, on the 
international front, Myanmar severely suffered the tide of the 
Cold War bloc politics and, on the domestic front, has struggled 
with factionalism and ethnic armed conflicts as well as with the 
flame of Kuomintang aggression. In this very delicate and frail po-
litical vicious circle, non-alignment was chosen as the best policy. 
The Bandung Five Principles were the classical principles that re-
flected the reality of time, place and complexity. […] However, in 
1960s, Myanmar practised aggressive neutralism. It not only stayed 
away from international institutions, such as the International 
Momentary Fund (IMF), but also withdrew membership from the 
Non-aligned Movement (NAM) that it helped establish; thus em-
barrassing the country and making it a mockery. Political and mili-
tary situations deteriorated to such a point that all the national 
races living on the same stretch of land took up arms. Sino-
Myanmar riots and conflicts had grown in Yangon city and border 
areas. By cutting political, economic and developmental relations 
with international community, it has followed an isolationist [for-
eign] policy. […] Today in 2016, drawing lessons from the past, 
Myanmar’s foreign policy gives priority to friendly relations, not 
only with neighbouring countries but also with countries all over 
the world. Myanmar is at the strategic junction of South Asia and 
Southeast Asia. It has become geopolitically significant. It is nec-
essary to take advantage of this challenge and significance [of be-
ing in a geographically significant position] as opportunities for 
peace, prosperity and mutually beneficial cooperation. A foreign 
policy that rests solely on the benefit of oneself is not a good poli-
cy. […] Isolationist policy must be abandoned. In those important 
issues that arise in international forum, independent and active 
foreign policy that firmly stands on democratic principles of uni-
versal truth is the only policy appropriate to the present age. Es-
pecially in regional organisations and projects like ASEAN, we 
should work together for the benefit of both the country and the 
region. We will have friendly relations with the United Nations, 
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the World Bank, and the IMF. […] In essence, Myanmar’s foreign 
policy is a “win-win” [let him win; let me gain advantage] policy. It 
is a policy of “beauty of the both sides”. It is a policy of “let enmi-
ty be short and amity long”. The people-to-people relationship is 
the key driving force of [Myanmar’s] foreign policy.  
Overall, the NLD’s foreign policy statements indicate that a key objec-
tive is to put Myanmar back on the international stage and on the world 
map. It is also about Myanmar foreign policy, under the guidance of 
Aung San Suu Kyi, becoming more independent and active on the inter-
national stage. 
2 Public Expectation on the NLD’s Foreign 
Policy 
Public expectations regarding the NLD’s foreign policy performance are 
quite high. On 1 April 2016, on the first day of the new administration, 
the state-owned Myanma Alin newspaper carried an article entitled “The 
Field of International Relations and Myanmar’s Status” by Z Pe Win. 
The article stated: 
Now, as the Nobel laureate with over 130 medals and internation-
al influence is going to assume the duty of foreign minister, it is 
absolutely certain that Myanmar’s role in international relations 
will be heightened. […] It is now that Myanmar is on the right 
track to become a shining star in the international community af-
ter half a century of withered life. Myanmar’s active neutralist for-
eign policy will be dynamic. With correct policies of the new gov-
ernment, based on national reconciliation, domestic peace, and the 
emergence of democratic federal union, Myanmar is now ready 
for a deserved status in the field of international relations. (Z Pe 
Win 2016) 
On 7 April 2016, despite just a week into the new administration, the 
same newspaper claimed: “with the emergence of a democratically elect-
ed civilian government after more than half a century, Myanmar’s foreign 
policy has become more dynamic” (Myanma Alin 2016a).  
Another article in a private weekly journal took a similar tone: “For 
nearly 50 years, unfortunately thanks to military generals, our country 
became isolated”, said the author. He continued:  
After coming to power of the NLD government led by President 
U Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, not 
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only for economic reasons but also for diplomatic ones, it is 
hoped that [the government] will make effort to make Myanmar 
earning respect from both great powers and developing countries 
around the world, and I firmly believe that Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi will fulfil this hope. (U Tin Oo 2016)  
In another article, author Dr Yan Myo Thein, apparently with high ex-
pectations, wrote that  
ASEAN will warmly welcome State Counsellor Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi since her international fame and influence is supportive 
not only for Myanmar people but also for ASEAN region and 
ASEAN people,  
and that  
with her backing, ASEAN and regional politics will become 
stronger and more powerful. (Yan Myo Thein 2016a) 
The same author, in an earlier publication, gave a similar message of the 
need for ASEAN to employ Aung San Suu Kyi’s fame and influence to 
get out of the regional political context and to attain a strategic position 
in world political setting. At the same time, he claimed that  
if Myanmar could implement foreign policy independently, active-
ly and without any alignment for five years under the new [NLD] 
government, Myanmar will reach a top strategic status in interna-
tional diplomacy. (Yan Myo Thein 2016b) 
When Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong asked Aung San 
Suu Kyi to take “an active leadership role in international arena and 
cooperation on behalf of ASEAN” during his visit on 7 June 2016, ex-
pectations of Myanmar’s international role was further enhanced among 
the Myanmar public.  
As illustrated above, there are clearly great public expectations on 
the new NLD-led government in general and on Aung San Suu Kyi in 
particular to raise the country profile in international community. She is 
expected to raise the self-esteem and self-confidence of Myanmar people 
as they have, for a long time, suffered a sense of insecurity and inferiority. 
One case in this regard is noteworthy to demonstrate this point. On 15 
April 2016, a renowned Thai journalist with extensive experience cover-
age Myanmar affairs, Kavi Chongkittavorn, published an online article 
titled “Myanmar’s Mirror – 10 Tips: ‘the ASEAN Way’ vs. ‘the Suu Kyi 
Way’” on Mizzima, a well-known online and print media in Myanmar 
(Chongkittavorn 2016a). The same article was reprinted in the Nations 
newspaper in Thailand on 25 April 2016 under the slightly modified title 
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of “Dos and Don’ts for FM Aung San Suu Kyi” (Chongkittavorn 2016b). 
Then, on the same day, the article appeared as “Dos and Don’ts for Suu 
Kyi on Dealing with Asean: The Nation Columnist” in Singapore’s The 
Strait Times (Chongkittavorn 2016c). The article was basically about small 
tips for successful diplomacy in ASEAN as Aung San Suu Kyi is a new-
comer to the regional association. However, a Myanmar author named 
Tharawun (Pyay) took issue with this article, but referring to the Strait 
Times, and published a highly critical review article in a local weekly jour-
nal entitled “ASEAN ministers who are fearful of Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s power and influence (or) the superfluous Straits Times Newspaper” 
(Tharawun (Pyay) 2016). The author stated that Chongkittavorn’s article 
lacked any substance and accused it of being a coordinated attack on 
Aung San Suu Kyi in collaboration between a Thai journalist and a 
newspaper from Singapore. In Tharawan’s view, the article was merely a 
reflection of Thailand and Singapore’s fear and envy about being over-
shadowed by the fame of Aung San Suu Kyi. I am not sure what this 
author would say if he knew that the original article appeared first in 
Myanmar’s Mizzima media. This is an indication of frustration, inferiority 
complex and a lack of self-esteem and security, as Myanmar had long 
been an international backwater.  
Meanwhile, cautious views have also been expressed about the 
NLD’s foreign policy. During a debate on Myanmar foreign policy, or-
ganised by DVB (Democratic Voice of Burma) on 1 May 2016, participants 
discussed issues, including nationalist sentiment, that would undermine 
Myanmar’s foreign relations (Myo Thar Htet 2016). One article in a 
weekly journal questioned whether Aung San Suu Kyi could handle the 
“Chinese dragon” and the “American eagle”, which can shake up the 
global economy, in Myanmar’s new age of international relations (Zeya 
Thu 2016). 
3 NLD Government and Foreign Relations 
In her interview with China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency on 18 No-
vember 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi expressed the view that “Myanmar had 
no enemies, but relations with neighbours were more sensitive than 
others and needed to be carefully handled”. In her words, “ties between 
neighbours are always more delicate than that between countries far 
apart”. She continued:  
We’ll pay special attention to our relations in order to make them 
smooth, effective and clear [and] we maintain friendly ties with 
friends from far and near, and that there’s no reason establishing a 
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friendship is impossible, if both parties are willing. (Zaw and 
Slodkowski 2015) 
Within a couple of months after the new administration started, Myan-
mar received state visits from the foreign ministers (or equivalents) of 
China, Italy, Canada, Japan, Thailand, Singapore and the United States. 
The Indian foreign minister’s visit was cancelled at the last moment due 
to her health problem, it is believed. These visits were followed by visits 
from the foreign ministers of Turkey, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. 
In January 2017, delegates from Ukraine, the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom visited Myanmar. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister 
Stéphane Dion’s visit was intended to show his country’s support for the 
democratic transition in Myanmar. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Genti-
loni was the first senior Western diplomat to meet new Myanmar foreign 
minister; the visit was “to support Myanmar’s newly elected NLD gov-
ernment” (Agencia EFE 2016). Aung San Suu Kyi’s statement at the joint 
press briefing with her Italian counterpart on 6 April 2016 appeared to 
enlist Italy’s assistance in managing international expectation of Myan-
mar’s performance in both domestic policy and foreign relations.4 For-
eign ministers from Thailand and Singapore were the first regional 
neighbours to come to Myanmar; both countries have strong business 
interests and investments in Myanmar. The Singaporean visit also 
marked the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Visits by the Singaporean prime minister in June 2016, the 
Laotian president in August 2016, the Thai deputy prime minister and 
the Cambodian deputy prime minister in February 2017, and the Philip-
pine president in March 2017 showcased the importance of neighbour-
ing countries in Myanmar’s external relations.  
The first foreign visit by the new president, U Htin Kyaw, and the 
state-counsellor-cum-foreign-minister, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was to 
Laos on 6 May 2016, a safe destination with no geopolitical controversy. 
The visit was intended to show support for Laos’ term of ASEAN 
                                                 
4  Aung San Suu Kyi said: “Our nation is made up of many ethnic peoples, and 
because of that we put great emphasis on the need for unity and peace. With-
out unity and peace, nothing else can succeed. I am sure that Italy is more 
aware of this than any other countries because Italy has a long history of deal-
ing with different peoples all over the world. Since the time of Rome when Ita-
ly stretched its arms far and wide, it has understood the complexity of relation-
ships between different cultures and peoples. And because of this understand-
ing, as a basic principle of successful foreign relations, I have no doubt that, 
Italy will help us in our efforts to establish good relations with our friends all 
over the world.” 
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chairmanship. This one-day trip was the least controversial overseas trip 
by the NLD government leadership. So far, this is the only trip that the 
president and the state counsellor have undertaken together. The presi-
dent’s role in Myanmar’s foreign relations is mostly ceremonial. He went 
to Russia in May 2016 for Russia-ASEAN summit, to Mongolia in July 
for the 11th ASEM Summit, and to Vietnam in October for the 8th 
CLMV Summit and the 7th ACMECS Summit. For bilateral state visits, 
he journeyed to India in August 2016 and to Cambodia in February 2017. 
September 2016 was the busiest month for the state counsellor since she 
has extensively travelled, first to Laos for the 28th and 29th ASEAN 
summits and related summits, then to the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and finally to the UN to attend the General Assembly. 
Then, in mid-October, she went to India for BIMSTEC summit, where 
she also had separate bilateral meetings with the leaders of Sri Lanka and 
China. 
As the de facto head of government, State Counsellor Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi’s first destination for a bilateral visit was in June 2016 to 
Thailand, where the most significant number of Myanmar migrant work-
ers is living. The focus of discussion during the bilateral meeting was on 
Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand, whom she addressed in a con-
troversial mass meeting. During the visit, in order to  
enhance people-to-people contact along the border provinces, to 
improve the quality of living of Myanmar migrant workers in 
Thailand and to prevent the problems of human trafficking and il-
legal employment in Thailand,  
the Thai prime minister and Aung San Suu Kyi witnessed the signing 
ceremony of the three important documents: (1) Agreement on Border 
Crossing between the Two Countries (2) Memorandum of Understand-
ing on Labour Cooperation, and (3) Agreement on Employment of 
Workers.  
3.1 Relations with China 
The very first foreign dignitary invited by the NLD government was the 
Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, who came to Myanmar 
for a brief trip on 5 April 2016. Wang Yi held a meeting with Aung San 
Suu Kyi and a joint press conference, where the former confirmed Chi-
na’s position on Myanmar and support for Myanmar’s process of nation-
al reconciliation. “China-Myanmar relations are now at a new historical 
starting point”, said Wang Yi and he called for the two nations to “rein-
force high-level exchanges as soon as possible” and “to properly tackle 
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issues facing their cooperation” (Zhang and Wang 2016). Aung San Suu 
Kyi also proudly claimed that the visit was to honour the new NLD-led 
government in Myanmar. While the Chinese minister hinted at the re-
sumption of some Chinese projects or investment in Myanmar, particu-
larly in reference to the Myitsone hydropower project, which was sus-
pended by the previous UDSP government in late 2011, his Myanmar 
counterpart kept tight–lipped on the matter and simply claimed that she 
had not studied the relevant documents. The Chinese foreign minister 
also met the commander-in-chief of defence services and the general 
secretary of the USDP. 
In fact, China has been carefully building up a relationship with the 
NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi since the party’s entry into parliamentary 
politics in 2012. The party-to-party relations have been cultivated for 
some time and Aung San Suu Kyi was invited to China for a visit during 
which Chinese dignitaries, including President Xi Jinping, received her 
warmly and accorded her a red carpet welcome. However, soon after the 
election outcomes indicated that the NLD was the winning party with an 
absolute majority to form a government, the Global Times, a newspaper 
that is linked to the Communist Party of China (CPC) and reflects the 
party line, editorialised what could be considered as “China’s position on 
Myanmar” and subtly warned of the disadvantages of moving too close 
to the United States (or the West in general). The paper said: 
There is also a focus on possible adjustments to Myanmar’s for-
eign policy, particularly its relations with China. The Sino-Myan-
mese relationship has seen a swing in recent years from tilting to-
ward China to a middle point between China and the West. My-
anmar can continue to fine-tune the position, yet its strategic sig-
nificance will be framed. No observer deems that Myanmar will complete-
ly tilt toward the US as such a witless move would ruin the strategic space and 
resources it can obtain from China’s amicable policies. Some analysts even 
predict some backswing in China-Myanmar relationship. The dis-
ruption of large programs between the two sides does not serve 
Myanmar’s interests. The NLD is more persuasive to the public 
than the current regime and Suu Kyi has never publicly spoken ill 
of these large projects, which partly prepares the two countries to 
resume cooperation on the large projects. During the transition of 
bilateral ties from special to normal, China has been strategically 
magnanimous and kind. It neither finds fault with Myanmar nor 
obstructs its other diplomatic options. Keeping a friendly and co-
operative relationship with China serves the long-term national in-
terests of Myanmar. Why should Myanmar limit its choice to the 
US only? Myanmar aligning with the US is conceived by some 
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people from the ideological perspective, but national interests are 
diverse and overlapping. Myanmar will only seek to maximize its 
national interests rather than make strategic sacrifices to court 
China or the US. (Global Times 2015) (Italics added) 
There are several issues, both political and economic, in bilateral rela-
tions that China and Myanmar need to tackle. With the strong political 
legitimacy that the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi enjoys, it is likely that the 
Myanmar government could deal with them with more confidence for 
mutually beneficial relations at the same time as maintaining Myanmar’s 
freedom of action.  
Suu Kyi’s trip to China in August 2016, rather than going to the 
United State first, was believed to be a pragmatic choice given that China 
plays an instrumental role in Myanmar’s stability and security. Ever since 
the NLD came to power, she had completely dropped her critical tone 
of China and presented a reasonably pragmatic outlook in her dealing 
with the giant neighbour. Her visit was at the invitation of Premier Li 
Keqiang, which indicated that she was regarded as head of government. 
During her five-day trip to China (17–21 August 2016), she was cordially 
received by President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and Chairman 
Zhang Dejiang of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress. During their encounters,  
the two sides had in-depth exchange of views and reached im-
portant consensus on carrying forward their traditional friendship 
and advancing their comprehensive strategic cooperative partner-
ship in the new era.5  
A significant aspect of the visit was the NLD administration’s official 
acknowledgement of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative as well as the 
initiative of Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corri-
dor and, more importantly, (re)assurance of its adherence to the one-
China principle, and expressed its understanding and support of China’s 
position on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. The joint communiqué issued at 
the end of the visit stated: 
Both sides spoke highly of the “Pauk-Phaw” friendship between 
the two countries, and agreed that as joint initiators of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Myanmar and China will ad-
                                                 
5  See “Joint Press Release between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and 
the People’s Republic of China”, 20 August, online: <www.president-of fice. 
gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/statements-and-releases/2016/08/22/id-6528> 
(6 April 2017). 
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here to the above principles and work together for progress in bi-
lateral relations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual trust, equal-
ity and mutual benefit. Both sides affirmed that they would con-
tinue to uphold good neighbourly policy toward each other and to 
continue to attach priority to strengthening their bilateral relations 
for the mutual benefit of the two peoples and to promote greater 
stability and development in both countries. Both sides reaffirmed 
that they would always put the interests of the two peoples at the 
forefront, adopt a strategic and long-term perspective, and work 
to achieve new progress in their comprehensive strategic coopera-
tive partnership. 
Both sides agreed to maintain the tradition of close high-level con-
tacts, to enhance strategic communication and to deepen ex-
changes on the experience of governance. They further agreed to 
increase friendly exchanges and cooperation at different levels, 
particularly between political parties and peoples. 
The two sides agreed to promote rule of law in the border areas, 
and to enhance trade, economic cooperation and various forms of 
friendly exchanges that would contribute to the well-being of the 
peoples. 
The two countries also signed a deal to build a bridge near their border, 
32 kilometres from the border in northeastern Myanmar and near the 
Kokang region. It was also reported that China had agreed to build two 
hospitals in Myanmar’s two largest cities, Yangon and Mandalay. State 
Counsellor Suu Kyi and Premier Li agreed to “strengthen cooperation 
and to ensure prevalence of peace and stability in their border areas”. 
China reportedly supported Myanmar efforts to realise peace and nation-
al reconciliation through political dialogue and Premier Li reaffirmed 
China’s support for efforts to bring peace to northern Myanmar. When 
the Chinese side raised the issue of the resumption of Myitsone hydro-
power dam project, Suu Kyi simply replied that the matter was under 
review by a special committee and that she would follow the committee’s 
recommendations.  
Despite all these assurances, Sino–Myanmar relations have wit-
nessed difficulties as Myanmar authorities strongly suspect that China is 
behind the insurgent groups that attacked civilian targets and security 
outposts in Northern Shan State in 2016 and 2017. In addition, the My-
anmar government is fully aware that China holds the keys to the success 
of the peace process in Myanmar and it is essential and crucial to main-
tain good relations with China. In practical terms, Myanmar authorities, 
particularly in the military, have learned that it is in the long-term inter-
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ests of the country for Myanmar to positively engage with China, with-
out undermining the long-established and cherished foreign policy prin-
ciples.  
3.2 Relations with India 
Myanmar’s relationship with neighbouring India is likely to be smooth 
since India, as the world’s largest democracy, will be willing to assist in 
democratic institution building in Myanmar. Under the rubric of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi’s “Act East” policy, Myanmar has increasingly 
become an important land bridge for India to realise its strategic vision. 
A highway project between Tamu (India) and Mesot (Thailand) via My-
anmar could be an economic corridor that would benefit Myanmar. 
Indian investment in Myanmar is modest and does not have much of an 
image problem. Besides, Aung San Suu Kyi seems to have a sentimental 
attachment to India as she resided and schooled there for several years 
while she was with her ambassador mother in the early 1960s. As men-
tioned earlier, President Htin Kyaw visited India in August 2016. During 
the visit, the Indian government raised issues over border security and 
maritime security. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit 
highlighted these points and stated:  
the two sides alluded to the importance of sound border manage-
ment as an intrinsic part of maintaining border security, peace and 
stability along the entire length of their common border [and] 
agreed that Maritime Security Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal is 
vital for both countries.6  
The Indian leadership also promised to support Myanmar’s peace pro-
cess and national reconciliation. 
3.3 Relations with Japan 
It is expected that the NLD government will maintain pragmatic rela-
tions with Japan despite years of conflicting opinions about how to deal 
with the military government. During the visit of Japanese Foreign Min-
ister Fumio Kishida to Myanmar on 3 May 2016, Suu Kyi, in her capacity 
as foreign minister, clarified her position and said that it was natural for 
                                                 
6  See “Draft Joint Statement Issued on the Occasion of the State Visit of the 
President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to India”, online: <www. 
president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/statements-and-releases/2016 
/08/30/id-6557> (6 April 2017). 
  The NLD and Myanmar’s Foreign Policy 105
 

 
the Japanese government to maintain a relationship with Myanmar in a 
manner different from Western governments. She also accepted the 
diversity of views as she believed in democracy and felt that Myanmar 
and Japan have been using this diversity to work together to find solu-
tions. The Japanese side pledged to help Myanmar’s national reconcilia-
tion and peace process and to continue providing assistance for the new 
government. On 6 June, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani be-
came the first defence minister to come to Myanmar for the NLD gov-
ernment, and, in fact, the first ever Japanese defence minister to visit the 
country since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries in 1954. The Japanese defence minister pledged to build capac-
ity for the Tatmadaw in non-combat areas.  
In fact, the Japanese side has been reaching out to the NLD for 
some time. On 27 November 2015, shortly after the NLD won the elec-
tions, Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida received the NLD’s key figure 
and spokesperson U Nyan Win in Tokyo. During their encounter, Ki-
shida explained that “Japan intends to exchange opinions with the NLD 
in order to support democratization and development in Myanmar and 
strengthen Japan-Myanmar relations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan 2015). Then, in January 2016, a 15-member economic delegation 
from the NLD was invited by the Nippon Foundation to tour the Bank 
of Japan and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and hold meetings with the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the 
Financial Services Agency, and the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
during their stay from 23 to 30 January 2016 (The Nippon Foundation 
2016). A Myanmar parliamentary delegation, comprised mostly of NLD 
members of parliament and led by U Tin Maung Win, was invited to 
Japan in May 2016. The welcome reception for the delegation on 10 May 
2016 was attended by the Japanese foreign minister. Several meetings 
were organised not only at ministries related to foreign affairs, trade and 
infrastructure but also at the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
and the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). Finally Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi visited Japan in early November and, during the trip, the Japa-
nese government agreed to provide Yen 40 billion of development assis-
tance.  
3.4 Relations with Russia 
From the start of the new administration, Myanmar’s relations with Rus-
sia appeared to move in a positive direction. Myanmar’s Defence Minis-
ter Lieutenant General Sein Win went to Moscow for ASEAN-Russia 
Defense Ministers’ meeting. There, he met his counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, 
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on 26 April 2016 and discussed matters related to cooperation between 
the two militaries. The Russian defence minister has reportedly stated 
that “the bilateral cooperation is developing dynamically, especially in the 
naval field and culture” and that it will be further strengthened in the 
military and military-technical areas (Mizzima 2016). The Russian defence 
minister noted that one important direction of relations between the two 
militaries is in the field of education for Myanmar servicemen in Russia, 
apparently in reference to a large number of Tatmadaw officers pursuing 
their graduate education in Russian higher education institutes. In re-
sponse, Sein Win said that “Russian party and Russian army has support-
ed us when Myanmar was facing challenging times”. It was obviously a 
reference to Russia’s use of veto, together with China, to block UNSC’s 
resolution on Myanmar proposed by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in January 2007.  
On 5 May 2016, Deputy Defence Minister Rear Admiral Myint Nwe 
came to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Assembly) to present the My-
anmar-Russia Defence Cooperation Agreement for approval. He stated 
that the signing of the agreement would create a new level of defence 
cooperation between the two countries, thereby fostering dialogue and 
mutual understanding of defence policies in terms of international and 
regional security. It was further justified that the cooperation agreement 
will enhance counter-terrorism activities, exchange of information, de-
velopment of defence sector, and be supportive in UN-led peace keeping 
and peace-support operations. Five days later, the agreement was ap-
proved by the NLD-dominated Pyidaungsu Hluttaw without any objec-
tion. Meanwhile, Russian warships from the Pacific Fleet – the Admiral 
Vingradov and two other support ships – came to Myanmar for a port call 
from 18 to 22 May 2016. About the same time, President Htin Kyaw 
went to Sochi for the ASEAN-Russia Summit, where he was warmly 
received by President Vladimir Putin and held a bilateral meeting. On the 
military sides, Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of Russian Fed-
eration Colonel General Oleg L Salyukov and Myanmar’s Deputy Com-
mander-in-Chief Vice Senior General Soe Win visited each other’s coun-
tries in June and October 2016. In the meantime, international media 
reported that the Tatmadaw is going to receive several units of Yak-130 
advanced training aircraft from Russia and Russia will continue as a ma-
jor source of arm supply for the Tatmadaw. 
3.5 Relations with the United States 
For the last couple of decades, Washington’s Myanmar policy has been 
partially influenced by Aung San Suu Kyi. For the time being, the US 
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government seems to continue its Myanmar policy on a (human) rights-
based approach. One example is the issue of so-called “Rohingya” com-
munity, officially referred to by the Myanmar government as [illegal] 
Bengali migrants. In fact, there has been mounting pressure from the 
international community on the NLD government to address the prob-
lem. For instance, TIME magazine has already mentioned the Rohingya 
issue as one of the challenges for the new Myanmar government just one 
day after the inauguration.  
When the US embassy in Yangon issued a statement, on 20 April 
2016, extending condolences to the families of 21 people who died a day 
earlier when a boat transporting them capsized, it cited local reports and 
identified the victims as Rohingya. The statement has become a target of 
ire among the Myanmar public and a protest was staged in front of the 
US embassy in Yangon on 28 April, a day after President Htin Kyaw 
accepted the credentials of the new US Ambassador Scot Marciel. The 
story does not stop there.  
The New York Times’ editorial printed on 9 May 2016 criticised the 
NLD government on the Rohingya issue under the headline of “Aung 
San Suu Kyi’s cowardly stance”, generating rage among Myanmar people 
(New York Times 2016). The editorial highlighted the link between the 
Rohingya case with the US sanction policy. The editorial stated:  
In the end, the reason Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi doesn’t want the 
Americans to say “Rohingya” doesn’t really matter. What matters 
is that a woman whose name has been synonymous with human 
rights for a generation, a woman who showed unflinching courage 
in the face of despotism, has continued an utterly unacceptable 
policy of the military rulers she succeeded. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi 
would be wise to reconsider her stance immediately. Her halo has 
been a central factor in Myanmar’s reacceptance into the world 
community after decades of ostracism, but already there are calls 
by human rights groups in the United States for President Obama 
to renew sanctions against the country before they expire on May 
20. (New York Times 2016) 
A day later, on 10 May 2016, Marciel stated that he would continue using 
the term Rohingya to refer to people that the Myanmar government 
called “Bengali” despite the fact that the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has already sent an advisory note to all embassies in Yangon on 6 
May warning them against the use of the term. The ambassador ex-
plained: “Our position globally and our international practice is to rec-
ognize that communities anywhere have the ability to choose what they 
should be called [...] and we respect that” (Slodkowski 2016). This re-
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mark provoked strong criticism from the largely Buddhist Myanmar 
people and has become a heated issue among social media users. In 
order to cool the situation, the ambassador said that he would be careful 
when using terms that are not acceptable to the Myanmar people when 
he met Thura U Shwe Mann, chairman of the Special Projects Imple-
mentation Committee, on 11 May 2016, but he stopped short of promis-
ing not to use the term. In fact, on 12 May 2016, the State Department 
spokesperson, Ms Elizabeth Trudeau, categorically stated that the US 
government’s position is to continue the use of the term “Rohingya”.7  
Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Naypyitaw on 22 May 2016 
was intended to support the democratic transition taking place in Myan-
mar and to confirm Obama’s policy of making “Myanmar a central focus 
of US policy towards Asia.” With regard to Washington’s approach to-
wards Myanmar, Kerry explained that the US would maintain sanction 
policies in consultation with the NLD government to further deepen the 
reform process, with the aim of “consolidating a civilian-led democracy” 
in Myanmar.8 
During the joint press conference, a question was asked about the 
US’s position on the Muslim community (or Rohingya) in Rakhine state. 
Aung San Suu Kyi appeared to seek an understanding of the delicate and 
difficult situation to handle the Bengali (or Rohingya) issue from the 
international community and the United States in particular.9 The US 
                                                 
7  See U.S. Department of State, online: <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/05/ 
257138.htm#BURMA> (25 May 2016). 
8  John Kerry said: “In consultation with the elected government and working 
with our own Congress, we have adjusted our sanctions policy now to 
strengthen democracy, to encourage inclusive economic growth, and to facili-
tate foreign investment in the civilian-led economy; and at the same time, we 
are maintaining some sanctions in order to encourage all institutions, investors, 
and members of society to support the government’s continued reform efforts 
that are aimed at consolidating a civilian-led democracy. Since 2012, we have 
provided more than $500 million in assistance for civil society, for national rec-
onciliation, for democracy, for respect for human rights, and enhancing the 
health and the food security of vulnerable populations. And we have supported 
peace and reconciliation, as well as families and communities in many parts of 
the countries that – a country that have suffered from natural disaster or con-
flict, including in Rakhine state.” 
9  In her words: “Emotive terms make it very difficult for us to find a peaceful 
and sensible resolution to our problems. […] All that we are asking is that peo-
ple should be aware of the difficulties we are facing and to give us enough 
space to solve all our problems. […] What we are asking for is that those who 
really wish us well should be aware of the implications of the terms that they 
use quite, perhaps, unwittingly, not knowing the implications are for those of 
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secretary of state and Myanmar’s foreign minister had discussed this 
“very sensitive and divisive” issue during their meeting. However, Kerry 
was non-committal to abstain from using the term “Rohingya” and he 
categorically stated: 
I know it arouses strong passions here. At the same time, we all 
understand, as a matter of fact, that there is a group here in My-
anmar that calls itself Rohingya; we understand that and we used 
that term by ourselves sometimes. […] What’s critical to focus on 
is solving the problem; what’s critical to focus on is improving the 
situation on the ground to promote development, promote re-
spect for human rights, and to benefit all of those who live in 
Rakhine and throughout Myanmar. 
It is interesting to see the extent to which Washington will continue its 
Myanmar policy based on right-based value-driven approach. It will be 
equally interesting to see the extent to which Aung San Suu Kyi will use 
Washington’s policy and agenda to advance her political ambition. Quot-
ing US officials on the condition of anonymity, on 14 May 2016, Reuters 
reported that:  
Aung San Suu Kyi supported the extension of U.S. sanctions with 
some changes [and] discussions with her have focused on how to 
properly target trade restrictions so they do not hurt Myanmar’s 
overall economy, but keep pressure on military-owned institu-
tions.10  
As a gesture of support for the NLD government and the state counsel-
lor’s visit in September 2016, the US government announced it would lift 
some sanctions and remove significant barriers to doing business in 
Myanmar. However, it is possible that Suu Kyi might continue to use US 
                                                                                                    
us who have to cope with the actual problem that arises from this disagreement 
over what name to use. […] We are trying to find a solution this problem. 
While we are trying to find that solution, we would like our friends to be help-
ful in this to understand that we are not trying to do down any particular group 
but we are trying to find something some ways forward that will be acceptable 
to both. That is very difficult. I’m not denying that. If our well-wishers are not 
ready to cooperate with us, it will make our task that much more difficult, 
which is not to say that we are going to back away from it. We will still accept it 
as our responsibility and we will try to do the best we can to resolve the prob-
lem to the benefit of both communities.” 
10  See <http://in.reuters.com/article/myanmar-usa-exclusive-idINKCN0Y42H9> 
and <www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/yangon/20326-state-coun 
sellor-silent-on-sanctions.html> (6 April 2017). 
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sanctions as political leverage to seek further political concessions from 
the Myanmar army.  
3.6 Relations with ASEAN 
With regard to NLD’s foreign policy toward the regional institutions, 
such as ASEAN, it is far from clear. Neither the NLD’s nor Aung San 
Suu Kyi’s foreign policy statement mentioned ASEAN. Nearly two dec-
ades of strained relations between ASEAN as an institution (as well as its 
members) and the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi has raised questions about 
Suu Kyi’s position on the regional association. ASEAN and its member 
states have rarely communicated with the NLD and its leaders in the past. 
Diplomats from ASEAN countries in Myanmar stayed away from meet-
ings with the NLD or Suu Kyi. Generally, Suu Kyi was opposed to the 
“constructive engagement” policy of the association and criticised it for a 
lack of interest in promoting human rights and democracy in Myanmar. 
Even after the political liberalisation, during Myanmar’s tenure as the 
chair of ASEAN in 2014, the NLD and Suu Kyi did not participate in 
ASEAN-related functions.  
However, during her press conference together with Thai foreign 
minister on 9 May 2016, when a journalist asked about her opinion on 
ASEAN, Suu Kyi referred to her father’s idea of a regional organisation. 
She claimed: “I always take great pride in saying that way back in 1947 
my father talked about possibility of such a regional association as 
ASEAN”. She even said that her father had had this kind of idea even 
before the emergence of the EU and suggested that there should be a 
regional organisation for cooperation among the nations within the re-
gion and that cooperation was meant for fulfilling hopes and for bring-
ing happiness and peace.11 Since she considers ASEAN as something 
similar to an organisation that her father imagined way back in late 1940s, 
besides being pragmatic as the country’s foreign minister, it is likely that 
Suu Kyi will view the association in a positive light. However, it is diffi-
cult to know the NLD’s view on the role of ASEAN in regional and 
international affairs. Whether the NLD sees the ASEAN and its related 
institutions, such as ARF, as institutions to regulate regional great power 
relations or as instruments of great powers to maintain regional balance 
of power is not clear. It is difficult to understand the exact extent to 
which the NLD government will embrace ASEAN’s community build-
                                                 
11  What her father, Bogyoke Aung San, said in 1947 was the “United States of 
Indochina” and it was slightly different from rationales behind the formation of 
ASEAN and what the association is now.  
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ing agenda, identity creation and norm brewing; but most constructivists 
are interested in finding this out. In other words, the NLD government’s 
regional vision is not clear in any concrete terms.  
During his visit in June 2016, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong asked Aung San Suu Kyi to “act as a leader of joint ASEAN 
meetings with other countries, especially during the G20 summit”.12 She 
agreed and appeared to say that she would do what she can to mediate 
collaborations between the ASEAN and the international community. 
During her reciprocal visit to Singapore in December 2016, Suu Kyi was 
reportedly approached to play the role of an ASEAN leading statesper-
son. However, before long, Myanmar again became an issue among 
ASEAN countries when the so-called Rohingya issue started to draw 
public attention and criticism. The Malaysian government, for domestic 
political reasons, was critical of the way the Myanmar government han-
dled the issue, and therefore pressed for an informal foreign minister 
retreat.  
On the western border area of Myanmar, there were armed attacks 
on the security outposts run by the police in October and November 
2016. It was later revealed that the attacks were carried out by radicalised 
transnational network of Rohingya extremists. The situation let to securi-
ty operations by government forces and there were accusations of gross 
violations of human rights against Rohingyas. Some foreign media even 
used the term “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing” to sensationalise the 
situation. The dramatisation of the issue in international media outlets 
has further amplified and mounted international pressure on the NLD 
government. Some ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia and Indone-
sia, have taken this issue seriously and pressed the Myanmar government 
to address it properly. As a result, an informal retreat, chaired by the 
Laotian foreign minister, was convened in Yangon at the invitation of 
the Myanmar government.  
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat was finally held on 19 De-
cember 2016. At the retreat, Aung San Suu Kyi clarified the situation and 
informed her ASEAN counterparts about “the Myanmar government’s 
efforts to provide assistance to both the Rohingya Muslim community 
and ethnic Rakhine Buddhist communities affected by violence in the 
wake of the attacks”. During the open and frank discussions that ensued, 
the Myanmar government agreed to provide humanitarian access, most 
importantly the delivery of food, to the Indonesian and Malaysian gov-
                                                 
12  See <www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/20728-state-
counsellor-asked-to-lead-asean-joint-meetings.html> (6 April 2017). 
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ernments. The verbatim produced at the end of the retreat, by the Ma-
laysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reveals the harsh tone carried by the 
Malaysian foreign minister. While the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs issued a statement that claimed that the retreat had been called by 
the Myanmar government, regional newspapers and international media 
reported it as a Malaysian effort, basically refusing to give credit to the 
Myanmar government and its foreign minister. However, it was claimed 
that the Myanmar government was cooperative and frank, probably as a 
result of its decision to allow the flow of humanitarian aid to the effected 
community. Nevertheless, this issue, which is an ongoing problem, has 
more or less undermined and marginalised Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in 
standing up for ASEAN. In fact, at one stage, Malaysia was quite vocal 
in taking action against the Myanmar government by terminating its 
membership. On 30 November 2016, the Malaysian Youth and Sports 
Minister Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar told the annual gathering of the 
ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO): “to ASEAN, we 
demand that Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN be reviewed” and “the 
principle of non-interference is void when there is large scale ethnic 
cleansing in an ASEAN member state.”13  
Exactly a month later, Malaysia called an extraordinary meeting of 
the Organization of Islamist Cooperation (OIC) on the “Rohingya Is-
sue”. Just a day before the OIC meeting, Syed Hamid Albar, the OIC 
Special Envoy to Myanmar, said that the United Nations should inter-
vene in Myanmar to stop further escalation of violence and genocide 
against Rohingya.14 In this regard, Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued a statement:  
It is regrettable that Malaysia, a fellow ASEAN member, considers 
it fit to convene an extraordinary session of the Organization of 
Islamist Cooperation (OIC) to take up Myanmar’s Rakhine Issue. 
[…] It is disturbing to note that the OIC meeting held in KL on 
19 January 2017 failed to acknowledge that the situation was a di-
rect result of the well planned and coordinated attack on the po-
lice outposts in the northern Rakhine state on 9 October 2016 by 
extremist elements both funded and inspired from abroad. 
In other words, the Rohingya issue has somewhat constrained Myan-
mar’s diplomacy in ASEAN.  
                                                 
13  See <www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/154086-review-myanmar-a 
sean-membership-urges-malaysia-minister> (6 April 2017). 
14  See <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-oic-idUKKBN152 
0C5> (6 April 2017). 
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4 Conclusions 
There are several important features in NLD government’s foreign poli-
cy. First, the NLD’s foreign policy is not new, but it is different. It is 
obvious that the NLD administration has maintained a pragmatic and 
delicately balanced relationship among major powers and the NLD’s 
foreign policy is fundamentally a continuation of decades-old “inde-
pendent, active and non-aligned foreign policy” that Myanmar has been 
pursuing since the early 1950s. This message has been repeatedly con-
firmed by the NLD and its leaders. There is no significant change in the 
foreign policy objectives and principles and the adjustments are mostly 
in the realm of diplomacy; hence, the difference is in style, not in sub-
stance. It is “activism” and “people-centred approach” in diplomacy that 
make Myanmar’s foreign policy different. Naturally, the question is why 
Myanmar foreign policy under the NLD, which came to power with a 
powerful slogan of “change”, is not new but is different. In this paper I 
have presented four reasons for this: (1) the USDP government has 
more or less adjusted the country’s foreign policy, (2) the Tatmadaw 
continues to exercise strong influence over the foreign policy process, (3) 
the emerging geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region shape 
the country’s foreign policy choice, and finally (4) the NLD’s leadership 
style and political mandate provides little room for public access and 
input in foreign policy decision making. 
In full compliance with the constitutionally proclaimed “independ-
ent, active and non-aligned foreign policy”, the USDP administration, 
during its five-year tenure, had skilfully adjusted the country’s foreign 
policy with an aim of “reintegrating Myanmar into international commu-
nity”, which in turn required a diplomatic strategy to maintain delicately 
balanced relations among major powers around the world, particularly 
between China and the United States. It was during the USDP period 
that the Myanmar government managed to display key features of My-
anmar foreign policy and their true essence. Even in the practice of mul-
tilateralism, with an emphasis on regional institutions and regional coop-
eration, it was during the USDP government that the country embraced 
such a foreign policy strategy (see more detail in Maung Aung Myoe 
2016). Thus, if the NLD is prepared to preserve the “independent, active 
and non-aligned foreign policy”, as it stated, there is little room for major 
policy change. Aung San Suu Kyi’s pragmatic [re]engagement with China 
falls squarely within the frame of balanced relations among major powers. 
In reality, the 2008 constitution was designed to find a ruling part-
ner for the Tatmadaw in politics. Although the Tatmadaw does not have 
any formal role in foreign policy decision-making, it still exercises con-
  114 Maung Aung Myoe 
 
siderable influence over foreign policy process though its defence diplo-
macy and arms procurement; it could either strengthen or undermine the 
NLD government’s foreign policy goals and strategies. Official visits and 
meetings between senior Tatmadaw commanders and their counterparts 
from neighbouring countries indicate that the Tatmadaw is deeply in-
volved in managing Myanmar’s relations with neighbouring countries. In 
terms of arms procurement policy, for instance, the failure to lift the 
arms embargo imposed by the West or the United States has allowed the 
Tatmadaw to maintain some form of leverage over the NLD’s foreign 
policy. With these embargoes in place, the Tatmadaw is likely to rely on 
Russia and/or China for arms supply (Xinhua News 2016). The NLD 
government has to deal with the (indirect) pressure and influences com-
ing from the Tatmadaw, which is essentially the political establishment in 
Myanmar. At present, although it generally supports the NLD govern-
ment’s foreign policy position, the Tatmadaw, for its own strategic out-
look and practical necessity, has maintained a policy of maintaining sta-
ble relations with China and Russia, at the same time as having more and 
more engagement with the United Kingdom and the United States. In 
addition, the Tatmadaw has effectively managed Myanmar’s relations 
with neighbouring countries since there are several bilateral border issues 
that necessitated coordination between militaries from both sides.  
The emerging pattern of great power politics in the Asia-Pacific is 
also an important factor. Despite its stated policy of “rebalancing” or 
“pivot to Asia” in American grand strategy during the Obama admin-
istration, the US commitment in Asia-Pacific region is uncertain and 
questionable. This situation will be heightened under the Trump admin-
istration, which has already displayed “isolationist tendency” in US for-
eign policy. Moreover, China has become increasingly assertive in the 
region, particularly in the West Pacific Ocean, and become active in 
establishing its influence in Southeast Asia, particularly on the mainland. 
Under these circumstances, there are indications that some regional 
countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have increas-
ingly engaged with China, discreetly bandwagoning with the rising power, 
perhaps for both security challenges and economic opportunities. Espe-
cially in the case of Myanmar, since China holds the keys to the peace 
process and has leverage over several ethnic armed organisations, it has 
set the parameters for the Myanmar government to manoeuvre its for-
eign relations.  
The NLD’s leadership style and political mandate provides little 
room for public access and input in foreign policy decision making. The 
landslide electoral victory has provided an unprecedented political man-
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date for the NLD to rule the country. In this regard, in the context of 
democratisation in Myanmar, Larry Diamond issuing the following warn-
ing in his foreword to the first issue of Myanmar Quarterly:  
The challenge is particularly urgent when founding democratic 
elections produce a landslide victory for one party. In other coun-
tries, this outcome has often been associated with a slide toward 
renewed authoritarianism, for two reasons. First, in winning a 
landslide, the victorious party and its leader are tempted to think 
of themselves as the embodiment of the national will, with trans-
cendent moral authority that does not need to answer to political 
opposition or civil society. And second, as a practical matter, 
when one party dominates the political landscape, the political 
opposition lacks the numbers in parliament and the organization 
and standing in society to provide an effective check. (Diamond 
2016) 
Moreover, from a domestic structural perspective, the 2008 constitution 
does not provide any meaningful parliamentary oversight over the issues 
of foreign policy and it is the executive that has authority to manage 
foreign relations. There is also little “access point” through which socie-
tal forces could influence the direction of foreign policy.  
In terms of leadership style, just weeks before the NLD took office, 
Nicholas Farrelly remarked:  
The irony is that even at the best of times the NLD is far from a 
model of transparency or democratic management. The authori-
tarian instinct starts at the top, with Aung San Suu Kyi’s iron grip 
on decision-making. […] What has not changed is her require-
ment for intense personal loyalty and her need to remain the final 
authority. The NLD is her vehicle and, as its revolutionary leader, 
she makes no apologies for taking charge. (Farrelly 2016) 
This assessment remains essentially relevant and approving. To a large 
extent, Aung San Suu Kyi has remained the embodiment of national will. 
Recently, former US Ambassador to Myanmar Derek Mitchell, who 
was instrumental in engaging Myanmar, pointed out that the NLD ad-
ministration lacks “respect for civil society and media” (Mitchell 2017). 
What we are witnessing now in Myanmar, within the first year of NLD 
administration, is that the NLD and its leadership have increasingly mar-
ginalised the role of mediating institutions in governance. At the same 
time, the NLD leadership could effectively insulate itself from public 
pressure on foreign policy (decision making). In the context of Myan-
mar’s foreign policy, it means that the NLD administration could neu-
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tralise anti-China sentiment prevalent among Myanmar general public 
and pursue a pragmatic policy of balanced relations among major powers. 
Second, the NLD’s foreign policy statements reflect a neoliberal 
worldview with a greater reliance on “international institutions”. The fact 
that the foreign policy and diplomacy under the NLD government is 
people-centred means – if I may borrow lexicon from security studies – 
that the referent object in the emerging Myanmar’s foreign policy is not 
simply the “state” for its survival, but the “society” for its wellbeing. 
While the survival and security of the state is obviously at its core, a 
central objective of Myanmar foreign policy is no longer a narrow inter-
est of regime survival but for the best interest of both state and society 
in Myanmar. If this assumption is correct, it suggests a considerable shift 
in worldview, from one of realism to a neoliberalism in perspective.15 
What is not clear is whether the NLD government will place greater 
reliance on collective security and cooperative security institutions for 
the state security. Third, more attention will be given to multilateralism 
than to bilateralism in the NLD’s conduct of diplomacy. It is expected 
that the NLD government will actively participate in multilateral institu-
tions; again, this is something that the NLD’s predecessor has already 
engaged in this venture. 
Fourth, an expansion of diplomacy is expected. Based on various 
statements issued by the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s for-
eign relations will be conducted by multiple tracks of diplomacy, with 
more emphasis on people-to-people contacts. In this sense, Myanmar’s 
diplomacy will be conducted through government-to-government, mili-
                                                 
15  Realists tend to pay more attention to state security and survival and focuses on 
what is known as power politics, while neoliberals look closer at international 
cooperation and are interested in issues related to political economy, global en-
vironment, and human rights. Therefore, realists take a state-centric view of 
foreign policy to address the distribution of power in international system while 
neoliberal institutionalists favour international institutions and regimes to man-
age complex interdependence and various issues pertaining to the process of 
globalisation. For realists, international institutions and regimes are instruments 
of statecraft and they serve the interests of the state. States continue to support 
them if the cooperation fostered by these institutions and regimes do not un-
fairly advantage other states; in other words, realists are more interested in rela-
tive gain than absolute gain. For neoliberals, institutions and regimes, once es-
tablished, assume life of their own and they influence the foreign policy of the 
states; they promote and facilitate foreign policy agenda in both policy-making 
and policy-implementation by providing lower transaction cost or critical in-
formation and expertise. For them, absolute gain is more important than rela-
tive gain. Moreover, neoliberals are interested not only in state-to-state relations 
but also in multiple channels of relations among different communities.  
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tary-to-military, academia-to-academia, business-to-business, citizen-to-
citizen, media-to-media, party-to-party, parliament-to-parliament, and 
civil society-to-civil society relations. People-centred diplomacy is not 
free of problems. Various studies have revealed that there is a gap in 
term of perception between citizen and foreign policy elite. However, 
with a strong mandate and political legitimacy, the NLD government, 
particularly in the name of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, will be able to man-
age public expectations. 
Fifth, the NLD government is likely to maintain balanced relations 
with all major powers, especially among US, China, India and Russia. It 
is unlikely that the NLD government will align its foreign policy with the 
West in general and the United States in particular. In addition, contrary 
to rhetorical statements made by the NLD leadership in the past, by 
hijacking people’s emotions with regard to China’s behaviour in Myan-
mar, the NLD government will be pragmatic in its relations with China. 
Similarly, the NLD government has cultivated cordial relations with both 
Russia and the United States. While Washington is likely to remain at the 
centre of NLD’s foreign policy focus, Myanmar’s relations with the US 
will not necessarily be at the disadvantage of other major powers. More-
over, the necessity of balanced relations among major powers is further 
reinforced by a recent development where the United Kingdom and the 
United States proposed tabling Myanmar’s human rights issue at the UN 
Security Council, while China and Russia refused to do so.  
Sixth, there are opportunities for Myanmar’s foreign policy to be 
substantially independent, active and non-aligned. Since Aung San Suu 
Kyi enjoys widespread public support and political legitimacy, the NLD 
government will have a strong amount of latitude for diplomatic 
manoeuvring. With her international credentials, Suu Kyi could be a 
chief diplomat from the Southeast Asia region in terms of promoting not 
only Myanmar’s profile but also those of ASEAN and its related institu-
tions. Having said that, whether Suu Kyi will be able to play such a role 
remains to be seen under present circumstances. Meanwhile, the so-
called Rohingya issue has complicated Myanmar’s foreign relations and 
undermined Suu Kyi’s international standing and reputation. Even some 
Nobel laureates and human rights activities criticised her for a so-called 
lack of protection or practice of “ethnic cleansing” against Rohingya. By 
early 2017, when the United Nations released a report on the Rohingya 
issue, the amount of Western pressure on the NLD government and the 
state counsellor increased. Her international reputation as a champion of 
human rights has become seriously challenged and her credentials as an 
icon of democracy have been substantially undermined. Consequently, if 
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her international charisma and political support, drawn largely from the 
West, eventually runs out, she may find that her diplomatic manoeuvra-
bility has dramatically declined and Myanmar’s foreign relations will face 
more serious challenges. 
At the same time, the NLD needs to manage public expectation 
from both the domestic audience and the international community. Due 
to her huge popularity and great influence, Aung San Suu Kyi could be 
able to persuade her compatriots to leave foreign affairs in her hands. 
For the international community, it will be much more challenging as 
expectations are based largely on her credentials as a champion of hu-
man rights and universal liberal values. As mentioned earlier, just a day 
after the inauguration of the NLD-led government in Myanmar, TIME 
magazine published an article entitled “5 Challenges Facing Burma’s 
New Civilian Government” (Lewis 2016). One of the challenges identi-
fied was “an unwanted people” known as Rohingya; about 1 million 
people living mostly in two western-most corners in Rakhine state. The 
previous USDP government and the Myanmar military held a firm posi-
tion that the Rohingya are illegal Bengali migrants and are not entitled to 
hold Myanmar citizenship. This issue will be a difficult one as must bal-
ance the domestic popular sentiment of anti-Bengali migrants and the 
high expectation of foreign activists and rights advocates to protect “the 
minority”. Challenges also include civil-military relations. Since the 
Tatmadaw has exercised great influence on, if not control over, Myan-
mar’s foreign relations, particularly with neighbouring countries, it is 
necessary for the NLD government to establish smooth relations with 
the military. The lack of a good relationship and understanding between 
the NLD and its leaders on the one hand, and the Tatmadaw and its 
senior commanders on the other, could undermine the overall direction 
of Myanmar’s foreign policy.  
In sum, despite all these challenges, it is expected that activism in 
Myanmar foreign policy will be once again back on centre stage, with 
more dynamic diplomacy conducted through multiple tracks under the 
NLD government. Aung San Suu Kyi’s fame and global influence is 
perhaps the most important asset and driving force behind Myanmar’s 
return to the world of international diplomacy. Myanmar’s foreign policy 
under the NLD government, while retaining the survival and security of 
the state at its core, will not aim for the narrow interest of regime surviv-
al, but instead for the best interests of both state and society in Myanmar. 
Therefore, Myanmar’s foreign policy under the NLD administration led 
by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is not new, but it is different. 
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